Lessons cosmic catastrophes

The end of January - a mourning time for NASA. Their very catastrophe "heap" occurred in late January-early February. In the history of space exploration occurred five cosmic catastrophes, they killed twenty-one people. And the saddest thing in this disaster is that all of them might not be. None of them did not take place due to the action of an external force majeure, accident or a fault of the crew.

Introduction h4> To avoid disputes about what "cosmic catastrophe", in this article I will be understood by her incident with the death of cosmonauts / astronauts, which occurred in the operation of space technology in space flight or in preparation for it. Such incidents in the history of the five "Apollo 1", "Soyuz-1", "Soyuz-11", "Challenger STS-51-L», «Columbia STS-107».

Apollo 1 h4>

From left to right: Ed White, Gus Grissom, Roger Chaffee i>

Moon race between the USSR and the USA was in full swing. US spy satellites due knew that the Soviet Union built a new large rocket, which may take the moon of Soviet cosmonauts. Active machines tranquility flights also not added. Therefore, the development of ships "Apollo" was carried out in a big hurry. The command module "Apollo" was made in two versions - Block I test in the form of unmanned and fly to orbit the Earth, and Block II, which was to be finalized taking into account comments on the Block I, and would be suitable to fly to the moon. Two unmanned flight (AS-201 and AS-202) were successfully carried out in 1966, and the first manned mission is planned for the end of February 1967. Began training the crew. The module arrived at the launch site is not completely finished, hundreds of engineering changes were made in the process of preparing for the flight at the cosmodrome. January 27, was scheduled first test with simulated job command module on-board catering. It consisted in checking the performance of devices of the ship and home preparedness kit before the start, but without a real run. Tanks on the service module were not filled, pyrotechnic devices are disconnected, so the test is considered safe. The test started at one o'clock. It took quite difficult, there were many problems with communication, a set of ready went very slowly. At 18:31 on the intercom came the cry "Fire in the cockpit!". Fifteen seconds unit burst, unable to withstand the pressure increase. Astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee were not able to get out of the burning unit, and died.

The sequence of events h5> 18:30:54: According to the telemetry recorded surges.
18:31:04: You can hear the exclamation "Hey!" Chaffee and scraping sounds.
18:31:06: White Report: "Fire in the cockpit!" On TV you can see from left to right, fast moving flames, the smoke obscures the TV screens.
18:31:12: Creek allegedly Chaffee: "We have a strong fire!" The sound of bursting command module, shouting: "I'm burning!»
18:31:21: Open audio communication.
~ 18: 36: Staff Only at this point was able to get to the module, cut through the smoke and open the hatch of the module. The module was filled with smoke, fire generally ceased. Body Grissom and White were found in the hatch, the body was in the cradle Chaffee. According to the instructions of an emergency evacuation, he had to wait for the opening of the hatch and maintain communication. An autopsy revealed that the astronauts died from cardiac arrest caused by inhaling carbon monoxide. Burns bodies were posthumous.

The reasons for the disaster h5> The immediate cause of the accident was a spark or short circuit in the wiring. The exact location of the spark we only know about, there are different versions, wear insulation on wires (from the opening / closing flap technical) to static electricity. However, as in most of the technical systems, the factors that influenced the accident, there were several:
The main cause of death of the astronauts was the inability to quickly leave the command module. Hatch command module consisted of two parts. The upper part opens outward, the lower - in. Increasing pressure from the heat in the fire made the opening of the internal hatch impossible. The reason for choosing such a unique engineering solution known. In the next version, Block II, the hatch was opened to the outside, it would make for ease of escape during extravehicular activity at the end of the flight, the question of emergency escape capsule was not considered. The lack of emergency relief hatch was due to fears of an unauthorized operation, as happened in 1961 with Gus Grissom, who nearly drowned after the splashdown of the capsule due to the spontaneous ejection hatch.
On fire impact force that was in the cabin atmosphere of pure oxygen at a pressure above atmospheric pressure (16 psi or 1, 1 atm). In these circumstances, even burning those materials which normally are virtually non-flammable. Burning even aluminum. How different materials burn in pure oxygen can be viewed here . NASA successfully used an atmosphere of pure oxygen at previous ships - "Mercury" and "Gemini" This saves weight and simplifies the design of life support systems. Familiarity an atmosphere and lack of special problems has led to developers that it has ceased to be perceived as dangerous. On the contrary, in 1960, a test was almost killed when testing a mixed oxygen-nitrogen atmosphere.

The measures h5> To repeat of the disaster was not possible, the following actions were taken:

The atmosphere in the cockpit at the start was changed to 60% oxygen and 40% nitrogen. Luc was replaced by open outwards. All flammable materials have been replaced by non-flammable . Nylon replaced with "Beta-fabric" of fiberglass. The wires were covered with non-combustible insulation (Teflon). have been fixed in 1407 problems with the wiring. < br />

Implications h5> The "Apollo" was delayed by twenty months to correct various problems. After completions ships have proven to be very reliable, a very serious accident at the "Apollo 13" has not resulted in human casualties.

Soyuz-1 h4>

Day April 23, 1967 was difficult for the staff of MCC and developers "Soyuz". The ambitious mission of "Soyuz" -1 and -2 was thwarted. According to the plan, first launched into orbit "Soyuz-1" Vladimir Komarov. Then it had to be started "Soyuz-2" with the astronauts Bykovsky, Yeliseyev, Khrunov. The ships were to dock, and Elisha with Khrunov had to go to the "Soyuz-1" through open space. However, immediately after the start of "Soyuz-1" has serious problems: not open one of the solar panels, the system worked unstable ion orientation and refused solar-stellar sensor orientation. Asymmetrically opened solar panels shifted the center of gravity, do not get a twist on the sun to charge the battery, there were problems with the system orientation. The mission had to be prematurely terminated. With the return to Earth, too, have problems - system failures and asymmetry of the center of mass is not allowed to guide the ship in braking. PMU has developed a new emergency procedure manual orientation of the spacecraft. Komarov successfully oriented the ship manually. Deorbit burn was issued correctly, the ship came down from orbit, it took the division compartments lander and braking in the dense layers of the atmosphere. However, at the landing site was found crashed and burning lander. Cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov died.

The sequence of events h5> At an altitude of 9, 5 km was cleared hatch cover of the main parachute and drogue parachute was introduced, which was supposed to pull the main parachute from the bay. However, he could not do it, the main parachute was in the container. At a height of 5, 5 km automatic reserve parachute estimate the rate of decline as inadmissible and involving reserve parachute. However, he was shaded and drag parachute failed to open. With a speed of about 140 km / h "Soyuz-1" hit the ground. Stay in the tanks of concentrated hydrogen peroxide, which is used in the controlled descent, caused a very large fire that hampered the investigation.

The reasons for the disaster h5> The immediate cause of the accident was the failure of the main parachute. Drag chute did not have enough force to pull the main parachute. Put forward two possible reasons:

Violation of manufacturing technology lander. During manufacture lander was placed in an autoclave for the heat-polymerizing resin. However, because of the haste cap parachute containers were sent to the shop later, and autoclaved separately. Hatches parachutes something covered up, but apparently loosely, and volatile fractions were plastering the walls of the parachute container, making them rough, lumpy and sticky. Increased friction has made insufficient effort to brake parachute. An error in the design - because of the rush "Union" never before flight Komarov did not make a normal landing: drone "Cosmos-133" was blown up during the descent because of the risk of landing in the territory of the USSR, the ship 7K -tuples №1 landed on the reserve parachute because of incorrect operation of the emergency rescue at the start, "Cosmos-140" sat depressurized due to the burnout of the bottom. In normal planting increased pressure in the descent module squeezed container and to make an effort braking parachute insufficient. The cause of death was the refusal astronaut reserve parachute. Due to the aerodynamic shadowing braking parachute canopy, he could not be filled. The investigation revealed that during testing of the parachute system such failure has not been tested.
Ironically, the failure of an expansion of solar cell (caught on the screen-vacuum insulation), tore the flight program, saved the life of Bykovsky, Eliseev and Khrunov. They were supposed to fly on the same boat with the same fatal flaw.

The measures h5> The construction of the container of the main parachute was altered. The container is made tougher, increased its volume, changed shape and began to polish the inside. In the process of laying the parachute system each operation began taking pictures.

Implications h5> The "Union" was detained for eighteen months. Until the next manned flight was made six developmental unmanned launches. Problems with the parachute system no longer occurs

Soyuz 11 h4>

From left: Vladislav Volkov, Georgi Dobrovolsky and Viktor Patsaev. i>

1971. USSR lost the race to the moon, but asymmetrical response creation of orbital stations, which could be weeks, months in the future, and do science. She went to the end of the first expedition to the world's first space station. The crew of Georgy Dobrovolsky, Vladislav Volkov and Viktor Patsaeva successfully operated in orbit twenty-three days and was preparing to land. The crew moved to the "Soyuz-11" and undocked from the station. Braking and landing were like normally, but after the separation compartments lost communication with the crew. Lander made a successful landing, but the crew was found no signs of life. Resuscitation were unsuccessful, the astronauts were killed.

The sequence of events h5> In 1:47:28 GMT at an altitude of 150 km was divided compartments of the ship. At the same time spontaneously opened vent valve which must be opened only at the height of 2-3 km. The cabin became filled with mist - air vapor condenses due to the pressure drop. He was heard the whistle of the outgoing air. The astronauts turned off the radios that background noise does not interfere with the place to look for leaks. Most likely, they realized that the air escapes from the vent. Dobrovolsky (according to other sources, the boys) undid the straps and, according to some sources, was able to close the valve, but not the same. The fact that there were two valves, and each had a manual valve for opening / closing. After about twenty seconds the astronauts lost consciousness. For 115 seconds cabin pressure fell to 50 mm. Hg. Art. The astronauts were killed by asphyxiation.

The reasons for the disaster h5> The immediate cause of the accident was the spontaneous opening of vent valve at the time of the separation of the compartments. The compartments are separated by undermining the explosive bolts, and the process is accompanied by a sufficiently serious shake-up. The reason for spontaneous opening of the valve is not reliably established. There are several versions:

Violation of assembly technology. On the Internet, without reference tells about the worker who allegedly nedotyanul nut, tells stories do not fall out and the nuts tightened. This, of course, the rumors, there is no reliable information, but personally I think this version is the most likely. The quality problem - is the bane of any technically complex industry. The shock wave from the operation of explosive bolts. This was the version put forward by the commission of inquiry, however, numerous experiments in the chamber is not allowed to reliably reproduce the effect. In the design of the "Soyuz" was used the principle of "Any single failure in any system should not lead to non-fulfillment of the program, any second failure should not lead to danger for the life of the crew." However, in the case of a vent the principle was broken. The crew did not have suits and one valve failure was fatal. Repeated requests for seven years cosmonauts and members of the Air Force of the need spacesuits were not heeded by developers. Absence of depressurization used by designers as an argument about the reliability of systems. Involuntary exclusion spacesuits aboard the "Voskhod-1" (otherwise the three astronauts did not fit) was seen as the norm, and "Soyuz" was originally laid down no suits. The need to vent valve and the logic of their work is questionable . The valves have been introduced in the case of a coup lander landing, in which it is impossible to open the door. They are opened automatically at 2 km, but in the case of landing on the water, they can be closed manually. The idea to do manually open the valve, if necessary, without any automation reason no one came to mind. The controls were neergonomichny. In order to get to the valves Control valves, had to detach from the chair. It took time and made it impossible to access the valves in case of overload.

The measures h5> In the "Soyuz" space suits back and set the device to oxygen for them. It was worth the third member of the crew, flying together for a while, but the completion of the launch vehicle with the time allowed to return to a crew of three. Were revised controls, they are more ergonomic.

Implications h5>
The program was halted flights to twenty-seven months. Since then, the "Union" has operated for over forty years and has earned a reputation as a very reliable machine.

Challenger STS-51-L h4>

from left to right. Top row: El Onizuka, Christa McAuliffe, Greg Jarvis, Judy Resnik. Bottom row: Mike Smith, Dick Scobee, Ron McNair. I>

The period 1984-1986 was a true "golden age" for the program "Space Shuttle". The first flights on jetpacks, first fix the satellite in orbit, the first return of the broken satellite to Earth in the cargo bay, twenty-three of the satellite, and one hundred forty two ton payload over two years! In April 1985, the shuttles were launched at intervals of just seventeen days. The mission of the "Challenger» STS-51-L was to break this record, scheduled for launch in just sixteen days after the mission STS-61-C. Shuttles are ready to start on both launch sites at the same time, and Space Center. Kennedy was really similar to the spaceport of science fiction. Mission "Chellenzhdera" was somewhat unusual, as part of the crew was a school teacher. Her task was to conduct a lesson from orbit. The press and the public lost interest in the space program, NASA, and the program "teacher in space" was to revive him. The idea failed - January 28, 1986 the main TV channels showed only the first seconds of start-up and switched to standard broadcasting network. But after a few minutes they had to go on the air with a special edition - "Challenger" was killed along with the crew.

The sequence of events h5> A small channel led the broadcast, from the standpoint of the viewer it looked like this:







2003.